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Privatization Matters: Bank Efficiency in Transition Countries 
 
John Bonin, Iftekhar Hasan and Paul Wachtel 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
To investigate the impact of bank privatization in transition countries, we take the 
largest banks in six relatively advanced countries, namely, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. Income and balance sheet characteristics are 
compared across four bank ownership types. Efficiency measures are computed from 
stochastic frontiers and used in ownership and privatization regressions having dummy 
variables for bank type. Our empirical results support the hypotheses that foreign-owned 
banks are most efficient and government-owned banks are least efficient. In addition, the 
importance of attracting a strategic foreign owner in the privatization process is 
confirmed. However, counter to the conjecture that foreign banks cream skim, we find 
that domestic banks have a local advantage in pursuing fee-for-service business.  Finally, 
we show that both the method and the timing of privatization matter to efficiency; 
specifically, voucher privatization does not lead to increased efficiency and early-
privatized banks are more efficient than later-privatized banks even though we find no 
evidence of a selection effect.  
 
JEL Classifications:  P30, P34, and P52 
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1. Introduction 
Banking sectors in the transition economies of Central and Southeastern Europe 
were restructured dramatically the 1990s.  Beginning with a financial organization that, in 
most cases, was designed to support the central planning apparatus, new governments 
moved to create modern commercial banking sectors immediately. The first rudimentary 
step was to divest commercial and retail activities from the portfolios of national banks 
and to set up new joint-stock banks with universal licenses that were fully state-owned 
initially. Bank privatization was an essential part of the financial reform agendas in these 
countries. Although much descriptive work exists on these financial sector reforms and 
bank privatizations, e.g., Bonin, Mizsei, Székely, and Wachtel (1998), no systematic 
empirical work was possible until sufficient time had elapsed to make the construction of 
a meaningful dataset possible. The basic issue to investigate is whether or not 
privatization improves bank performance. Although the theoretical literature indicates 
that private firms should outperform government-owned firms, empirical evidence is 
needed to confirm this theoretical hypothesis for banks in transition countries.  
 The empirical literature provides evidence of the influence of ownership on the 
performance of individual banks and on the effectiveness of the banking sector.  In a 
cross-country study, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) find that the 
performance of government-owned banks is inferior to that of private banks.  Claessens, 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) investigate performance differences between 
domestic and foreign banks in eighty countries, both developed and developing, over an 
eight-year period from 1988 to 1995.  These authors find that foreign bank entry was 
followed by a reduction in both the profitability and the overhead expenses of domestic 
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banks and that foreign banks in developing countries perform better than do domestic 
banks. For Latin American countries, Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg (2001) argue that 
foreign bank entry is associated with improved production of financial services and more 
banking competition; in addition, they claim that it facilitates the early waves of 
privatization of government-owned domestic banks.  Hence, this empirical literature 
provides evidence that ownership matters; in particular, government ownership of banks 
is less efficient than private ownership and foreign bank entry has a salutary effect on 
banking sectors.  
Much of the empirical literature on banking in transition countries addresses the 
impact of foreign bank entry on banking efficiency.  Hasan and Marton (2003), Drakos 
(2003), and Fries and Taci (2003) demonstrate that the entry of more efficient foreign 
banks creates an environment that forces the entire banking system to become more 
efficient, both directly and indirectly, in transition countries.  Buch (2000) compares 
interest rate spreads in the three fast-track transition countries, Hungary, Poland and the 
Czech Republic, from 1995 to 1999.  She finds evidence confirming the hypothesis that 
foreign banks create a more competitive market environment in transition economies, but 
only after they have attained sufficient aggregate market share. A few studies examine 
the effects of ownership on individual bank efficiency.  For Poland, Nikiel and Opiela 
(2002) find that foreign banks servicing foreign and business customers are more cost-
efficient but less profit-efficient than other banks in Poland.   Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel 
(2003) examine the performance of banks in eleven transition countries and show that 
majority foreign ownership is associated with improved bank efficiency.  However, these 
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authors cannot investigate privatization directly because their data do not distinguish 
among different types of foreign bank ownership.   
Studies focusing specifically on the effects of bank privatization are less 
numerous. Verbrugge, Megginson and Owens (2000) document marginal performance 
improvements and increases in equity among privatized banks in OECD countries.  For 
Argentina, Clark and Cull (1999, 2000) study the privatization process and show that the 
success of the provincial bank privatization depended on the effectiveness of the buyers. 
These authors find evidence that credit allocation and efficiency are higher in privatized 
banks.  The transformation of the Argentine banking system occurred mainly through 
domestic mergers and acquisitions so that foreign banks played only a relatively minor 
role.  In the transition countries, the prevalence of foreign strategic owners in formerly 
state-owned but subsequently privatized banks makes it crucial to distinguish these banks 
from foreign greenfield banks when analyzing bank privatization.  
In this paper, we focus on six relatively advanced transition countries, namely, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. We chose not to 
include banks in very small transition economies, e.g., the Baltic countries and Slovenia, 
and those in less advanced transition economies that have only recently restructured the 
banking system, e.g., the former Soviet Union, Albania and the other Balkan states.  In 
the next section, we present a brief description of the privatization experiences in these 
six countries to establish that the strategies and the timing of privatizations are 
sufficiently different to allow us to use these experiences as the basis for an empirical 
analysis of privatization.  Section 3 describes our dataset and presents the results of 
testing for differences in means across bank types for several measures of bank 
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performance and for several bank characteristics.  Section 4 characterizes briefly our 
methodology of deriving profit and cost efficiency measures from stochastic frontier 
estimates that allow for country and year effects directly in a pooled data set.  In this 
section, we relate the bank efficiency scores, as well as a measure of financial 
performance, to the type of ownership and the method of privatization in second-stage 
regressions. Section 5 concludes with a brief summary focusing on policy implications.  
 
2.  Bank Privatization in Six Transition Economies 
Pre-transition banking sectors were designed to meet the needs of a centrally 
planned economy (CPE).  Intermediation between savers and borrowers was internalized 
within the state banking apparatus basically through a system of directed credits to state-
owned enterprises for both investment needs and budget allocations for the working 
capital necessary to meet the output plan. In most CPEs, large specialty banks performed 
specific functions. A state savings bank, with an extensive branch network, collected 
virtually all household deposits. A foreign trade bank handled all transactions involving 
foreign currency. An agricultural bank provided short-term financing to the agricultural 
sector. A construction bank funded long-term capital projects and infrastructure 
development. Hence, banking activities were both subservient to the plan and segmented 
along functional lines in CPEs.  
In the transition economies (TEs), the first step in banking sector reform involved 
creating a two-tier system with commercial banking activities carved out of the old 
central bank. At the beginning of the decade, the new banking sectors in the former CPEs 
consisted of the newly created commercial banks and the specialty banks, both types 
 6
having universal banking licenses, along with a few foreign greenfield banks and often 
many relatively undercapitalized de novo domestic private banks that were born under lax 
entry requirements.  Specialty banks had virtual monopolies in their core activities, e.g., 
the savings bank was often the only entity with an extensive enough branch network 
throughout the country to collect primary deposits.  Typically, three or four large banks 
dominated the emerging banking sector in a TE.  Both the newly created commercial 
entities and the specialty banks were state-owned initially.  Hence, structural 
segmentation, a proliferation of weak small domestic private banks, and state-ownership 
of the large banks were the major features of banking sectors in TEs at the beginning of 
the 1990s. 
These legacies affected the banking sectors in all of the countries in our sample 
with the exception of Croatia, which was part of Yugoslavia.  From the 1950s, 
commercial banks in Croatia as well as the other republics were not state-owned but were 
owned collectively according to the Yugoslavian system of self-management.  Virtually 
all foreign exchange deposits collected by the republic-level banks were remitted to the 
National Bank of Yugoslavia in Belgrade in exchange for credits in dinars.  Upon 
succession in June 1991, the Yugoslavian government froze the foreign exchange 
deposits of Croatian banks. Hence, Croatian banks faced a currency mismatch between 
assets and liabilities creating large holes in their balance sheets after succession. At the 
end of 1995, four Croatian banks were selected for government rehabilitation because of 
the poor quality of their loan portfolios. Involvement in this program resulted in these 
banks being nationalized so that four large state-owned banks were created in Croatia in 
the middle of the 1990s.   
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The three more advanced TEs, i.e., Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, 
embarked on significantly different bank privatizations programs during the first half of 
the 1990s.  Even before the political change, the Hungarian government had been 
receptive to foreign bank activity as it allowed three foreign banks to operate in the 
country from 1985.  By the end of 1994, the Hungarian foreign trade bank had been 
purchased by a foreign owner and foreign investors held about 20% of total banking 
assets in Hungary. In the Czech Republic, three of the largest four banks participated in the 
first wave of voucher privatization in 1992.  Investment funds, the largest of which were 
created by these banks, were an integral part of the Czech voucher privatization program.  
Hence, this initial divestiture of state holdings resulted in interlocking ownership with the 
state retaining large controlling stakes of voucher-privatized Czech banks. At the end of 
1994, although foreign investors held about 6% of banking assets in the Czech Republic, 
none of the large banks had any foreign ownership.  With some inducement from the G7 
donor countries and international financial institutions, Polish authorities set a three-year 
timetable at the beginning of 1993 for privatizing the nine medium-sized, regional, state-
owned banks that were created from the commercial portfolio of the national bank. 
However, by the end of 1994, only two of these banks had been privatized and only two 
more would be privatized before 1997.  Foreign ownership of banking assets remained 
insignificant in Poland at about 2% in the mid-1990s. 
Macroeconomic instability and financial sector distress made bank privatization 
infeasible in Bulgaria and Romania during the first half of the 1990s. By 1995, neither 
Bulgaria nor Romania had privatized any banks and foreign ownership of banking assets 
was negligible at less than 1% in both countries. In Croatia, only one small foreign bank 
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was operating in 1995 and there was hardly any foreign ownership of banking assets.  Of 
the six countries, only Hungary and to a lesser extent Poland had committed to selling 
banks to foreign investors by the end of the first half of the 1990s.  However, by the end 
the decade, five of the six countries were embarked on, or had completed, privatizations 
that would put at least 75% of their banking assets under foreign control by 2002.   
The second half of the 1990s witnessed a flurry of bank privatizations in these 
countries.  Appendix A lists the banks in our sample from each country ranked according 
to market share at the end of the decade.  Information on each bank’s status throughout 
the 1990s is provided and, when relevant, the bank’s privatization is dated. Bank 
privatization proceeded relatively swiftly in Hungary; by mid-1997, eight of the top ten 
banks were majority foreign-owned.  After a few initial bank privatizations, the Polish 
government became sidetracked by a bank consolidation initiative that was intended to 
fend off foreign competition. Nonetheless, a combination of mergers and privatizations 
involving foreign partners left foreigner investors holding more than 75% of Polish 
banking assets by 2000. Although the Czech government was late to recognize the 
importance of attracting strategic foreign investors for its large voucher-privatized banks, all 
major banks were sold to foreign owners by mid-2001.  
Both of the southeastern TEs, i.e., Bulgaria and Romania, began bank 
privatization only in the late 1990s.  After instituting a currency board and stabilizing the 
macroeconomic environment, the Bulgarian government privatized its first bank to a 
consortium of investors in 1997.  By the end of 2000, eight of the ten largest banks in 
Bulgaria were foreign owned. Romania is a laggard in bank privatization compared to the 
other former CPEs.  In 2000, foreign investors owned less than half of Romanian banking 
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assets and two of the three largest banks remained state-owned as late as 2003.  
Beginning in 1995 with virtually no holdings in Croatia, foreigner investors had acquired 
about 84% of banking assets by 2000 and, by 2002, all of the ten largest banks in the 
country were majority foreign owned.  
In summary, Hungary was the first country to shed the legacies of the CPE by 
privatizing all but one of its major banks by mid-1997. In Poland, after some delay in the 
privatization timetable, only the zloty savings bank and the umbrella agricultural bank 
remain state-controlled. Initially, the Czech Republic placed three big banks in the 
voucher privatization program but, despite a late start, foreign investors gained control of 
all large Czech banks by mid-2001.  The banking sectors in Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Croatia were financially distressed in the first half of the 1990s, albeit for different 
reasons, so that bank privatization could not begin until the late 1990s.  Once started, 
sales of banks to foreign investors were rapid in Bulgaria and Croatia.  Romania is the 
only one of the six transition countries in this study to retain significant government 
ownership in its banking sector through 2003 with only one of its three largest banks 
privatized. 
 
3. The Data and Bank Characteristics by Type 
The dataset consists of the largest banks by asset size in the six selected countries. 
As is shown in Appendix A, the smallest bank in the sample has a market share ranging 
between 2% in the Czech Republic and 4% in Poland.  Taken together, the large banks in 
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our sample hold more than 75% of the banking assets in their respective countries.1   
Restricting the sample to large banks yields a more homogeneous set of observations than 
is often found in other studies of banking in transition countries.  Homogeneity is 
important for investigating the effects of privatization on individual banks because 
privatized state-owned banks are usually among the largest banks in their respective 
countries.  Moreover, our sample contains a sufficient number of large banks of various 
types to make comparisons meaningful.   
Balance sheet and income data are taken from Thompson’s BankScope and 
Bureau van Dijk.  Data for each bank was examined to insure that all available relevant 
information was used.  Thus, we took care to avoid duplicating data for the same bank 
when alternative accounting standards or different levels of consolidation are reported in 
BankScope.  The total number of bank observations is 451; a bank observation is datum 
for an individual bank in a particular year. We have information for 67 different banks 
from 1994 to 2002, although data are not available for every year for every bank.2  Most 
of the observations are for 1995 to 2001 as Table 1 indicates.  In terms of country 
coverage, Romania has the fewest observations accounting for 9.1% of the total while 
Poland has the most at 25.5%.3   
 To facilitate our investigation of privatization, we divide the observations into 
four mutually exclusive bank types, namely foreign greenfield, domestic de novo, state 
owned, and privatized.  As reported in Table 1, foreign greenfield banks constitute almost 
                                                 
1  There are not exactly ten banks for several countries because of data limitations.  Moreover, by the end of 
the 1990s, some of the large banks in several of the countries are the result of mergers and acquisitions; 
whenever possible, we included the precursor organizations in our dataset.   
2  No data were available for three foreign banks listed in Appendix A because their balance sheets were 
consolidated with their parent banks.   
3  The large proportion of bank observations from Poland reflects the mergers and acquisitions that took 
place in that country in the late 1990s; when data are available we include observations for the major 
predecessor banks. 
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a quarter of all bank observations, which indicates the importance of foreign penetration 
into the banking sectors of these six transition countries. Domestic de novo banks make 
up the smallest category because only a few of the domestic entrants in the early 1990s 
grew to become one of the ten largest banks in its country by the end of the decade. 
About 10% of the total, or about 38% of the observations in the state-owned category, are 
banks that were not privatized during our sample period.4  The majority of the 
observations in the state-owned category represent the pre-privatization histories of banks 
that were privatized within the sample time period.  Adding the post-privatization 
experiences of both these banks and those banks that were privatized throughout the 
sample period to these pre-privatization histories encompasses almost half of all bank 
observations in our sample.5
 Privatization is concentrated in the post-1997 period as Table 1 indicates. The 
three years prior to 1997 account for less than 20% of the observations for privatized 
banks.6  In contrast, about 79% of all privatized observations come from the years 
between 1997 and 2001.7  Table 1 contains additional information about the privatization 
process.  The column labeled strategic owner indicates that a strategic foreign investor 
has a majority-controlling stake in a privatized bank or, in a few cases, in a domestic de 
novo bank. By definition, foreign greenfield banks are controlled by a strategic foreign 
owner but these banks are not included in this column.  Almost one fourth of all the bank 
                                                 
4 Six large banks, two in Bulgaria (DSK and Biochim), two in Poland (PKO and BGZ), and two in 
Romania (BCR and CEC), account for these observations as Appendix A indicates. 
5 Eight banks in the data set were privatized throughout the time period.  These are the three voucher-
privatized Czech banks (KB, CS, and IPB), two banks in Hungary (MKB and General Banking Trust), and 
three banks in Poland (BRE, BSK, and WBK). For these banks, we have no pre-privatization histories. 
6 In addition to the eight banks already identified, two banks in Hungary (OTP in 1995 and BB in 1996) 
and two banks in Poland (BPH in 1995 and BG in 1996) are privatized prior to 1997. 
7  Only limited data were available for 2002 when the data set was constructed; there are 9 observations of 
which 4 are for privatized banks.   
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observations are foreign greenfield operations and almost the same fraction is domestic 
banks with a strategic foreign investor.   In about 74% of all privatized observations, the 
bank has a strategic foreign owner.  Across countries, the percentage of privatized 
observations having a strategic foreign owner ranges from 43% in the Czech Republic, 
mainly due to voucher privatization, and 50% in Romania, due to its late start on bank 
privatization, to 72% in Hungary and more than 80% in Bulgaria, Croatia, and Poland.    
 To investigate whether bank privatization matters, we report the means for 
various performance measures and characteristics by bank type in Table 2.  With the 
exception of assets, all means are adjusted to remove country and year fixed effects.8   
The means are shown for each of the four ownership categories and for the whole sample.  
In addition, the last two columns show the means for the pre-privatization histories and 
the post-privatization experiences of the banks privatized in our sample period. Table 3 
contains signed t-statistics for tests comparing the means between privatized banks and 
each other bank type as well as between post-privatization histories and pre-privatization 
experiences.  A positive (negative) sign on a t-statistic indicates that privatized banks 
have a higher (lower) mean for that measure than do banks in the comparison category. 
Statistical significance at the 5% or better level is represented by a bold t-statistic in 
Table 3. 
Taking bank characteristics first, privatized banks are the largest of the four 
classes and foreign greenfield banks are the smallest at about half the average size of 
domestic de novo banks. To some extent, the difference in the mean asset size of state-
owned and privatized banks reflects the timing of privatization.  The first and last 
                                                 
8 The adjustment is made by regressing the particular bank characteristic on dummy variables for countries 
and years.  The adjusted value is the regression residual plus the overall mean; hence, it has the country and 
year effects removed. 
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columns of Table 3 present the effects of the bank privatization process.  Prior to 
privatization, banks are recapitalized and their balance sheets are cleaned of some bad 
loans.  Reflecting this preparation, the equity ratio increases significantly and becomes 
comparable that of foreign greenfield banks in privatized banks.  However, privatization 
is not associated with a significant decrease in loan loss provisioning or liquid asset 
holding. Relative to foreign greenfield banks, privatized banks have higher liquid asset 
and loan loss provision ratios.   The high liquid asset ratio of privatized banks reflects the 
legacy of state ownership on their balance sheets even though their equity ratios become 
comparable to those of foreign greenfield banks.  
 Regarding performance measures, the most popular one used in the financial 
literature is return on assets (ROA).  From Tables 2 and 3, ROA is significantly higher in 
privatized banks than in either state-owned or domestic de novo banks and lower, but not 
significantly so, than in foreign greenfield banks. After privatization, ROA increases 
dramatically from less than one-half of one percent to over one and a half percent.  To 
investigate the profitability of privatized banks further, we take net interest margin to 
represent a profit rate on lending and the commission-to-income ratio to represent the 
profitability of fee-for-service activities.  Net interest margin is higher in privatized banks 
than in domestic de novo private banks but it is not significantly different between 
privatized banks and either state-owned or foreign greenfield banks nor does it increase 
significantly after privatization. Somewhat surprisingly, privatized banks have the highest 
commission income ratio and one significantly greater than that of foreign greenfield 
banks; this ratio also increases significantly after privatization.  The presence of a 
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strategic foreign owner in most privatized banks may explain the increased focus on fee-
for-service business after privatization. 
 On the cost side, privatized banks have lower cost ratios than state-owned banks 
but higher ratios than foreign greenfield banks; although the cost ratio drops by about 
20% after privatization, this decrease is not statistically significant at the 5% level.  To 
probe cost management further, we consider the non-interest expenditure ratio.  
Privatized banks are outperformed again by foreign greenfield banks but there are no 
significant differences with other types.  After privatization, this ratio increases although 
not significantly perhaps indicating the need to incur expenses to modernize and upgrade 
technology.   
Turning to the intermediation measures, privatized banks have significantly lower 
loan-to-asset ratios and significantly higher deposit-to-assets ratios than foreign 
greenfield banks.  No other differences are statistically significant.  Hence, privatized 
banks retain their comparative advantage in collecting primary deposits.9  However, 
despite having a smaller domestic deposit base, foreign greenfield banks are more 
aggressive than privatized banks in lending to domestic firms. Overall, our results 
indicate that privatization improves the financial and business situation of banks in these 
transition countries, making them comparable to foreign greenfield banks in some 
respects, but it has no statistically discernible impact on intermediation. Financially 
speaking, privatization matters in terms of increased profitability, more fee-for-service 
income, and, to a lesser extent, improved cost management. 
 
                                                 
9  The measure of deposits does not differentiate between primary, i.e., household deposits, and commercial 
deposits.  Since commercial deposits are strongly positively correlated with business loans, we infer that 
privatized banks are still the major collectors of primary deposits in these countries.  
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4.  Efficiency Estimates and Regression Results 
 Although the accounting data are informative, we focus on efficiency measures to 
investigate the impact of ownership and privatization on bank performance. Berger, 
DeYoung, Genay and Udell (2000) review the literature on applying stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) to estimate bank efficiency.  Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel (2003) use this 
approach to examine the efficiency of banks in transition economies. In this paper, we 
use similar frontier specifications so that we provide only a brief summary of the salient 
features.  
The model estimated for cost efficiency is given by:  
  Yit  = f (Xit, Pit, Zit)  +  vit +   uit,
where Y represents total costs that are a function of various outputs, X, the price of 
inputs, P, and fixed effects for years and countries, Z.  As is common in the efficiency 
literature, we use a translog specification for the function with standard symmetry and 
homogeneity assumptions.  The random disturbance term has two components; vit 
represents measurement error and other uncontrollable factors, while uit represents 
technical and allocative inefficiency.  The frontier approach maintains that managerial or 
controllable inefficiencies, i.e., uit, increase costs above the frontier or best-practice levels 
that are subject to random fluctuations, i.e., vit.   We use a similar specification for the 
profit function except that Y is total profits and the disturbance becomes vit -  uit because 
managerial inefficiency reduces profits below the frontier or best practice level.   
The vit terms are assumed to be identically distributed as normal variates with zero 
mean and variance equal to .  The u2vσ it terms are nonnegative random variables 
distributed normally but truncated below zero.  We assume that the uit terms are 
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distributed independently but not identically.  Hence, for the i–th bank in year t, technical 
inefficiency, uit, is assumed to follow a half normal distribution with a non-constant 
variance, i.e., N(µ, 2uσ it). Because structural conditions in the banking sector and general 
macroeconomic conditions may generate differences in banking efficiency from country 
to country and over time, we include both country effects and time effects in the 
estimation of the frontier.  Specifically, the year and country effects appear in the cost 
and profit functions directly and as determinants of the variance, i.e., 2uσ it = Zit δ. 
 Total costs are the sum of interest and non-interest costs. The output variables  are 
total deposits, total loans, total liquid assets and investments other than loans and liquid 
assets.  The input prices are the price of capital, measured by the ratio of non-interest 
expenses to total fixed assets, and the price of funds, measured by the ratio of interest 
expenses to total deposits. Total profit is measured by net profit earned by the bank.  The 
output variables and costs or profits are normalized by total loans and the input variable 
is the ratio of the price of capital to the price of funds.  Thus, the specification assumes 
homogeneity with respect to prices and constant returns to scale.  Following the 
literature, we add a constant amount to profit for all banks to avoid having negative net 
profits for any bank observation so that we may take logarithms of all profit function 
variables.  We also estimated frontiers with alternative measures of cost and profit.  The 
cost frontier for non-interest expenditure is virtually identical to the total cost frontier and 
is not discussed.  The profit function using commission income is included in the 
ownership regressions below.  The stochastic frontiers are estimated with the LIMDEP 
Version 8 developed by William Greene.10    
                                                 
10  Econometric Software, Inc. (www.limdep.com).  
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 Summary statistics for estimates of the stochastic frontiers are given in Appendix 
B.  These statistics are the ratio of the standard deviation of the inefficiency component 
of the disturbance to the random component (σ u /σ v ), the standard deviation of the 
composite disturbance (σ), and the proportion of the variance in the overall disturbance 
that is due to inefficiency,  λ  = σu2/ σ2.  As Appendix B indicates, most of the variation in 
the disturbance from best practice is due to technical inefficiency rather than random 
error.   Since the cost and profit frontiers are translog functions, efficiency is defined as  
e-u, where u is the estimated inefficiency.  Hence, efficiency is always positive and it is 
equal to one for the best-practice or zero-inefficient bank. Individual bank efficiency is 
measured relative to best practice; the means and standard deviations of cost and profit 
efficiency are reported in Appendix B.     
To investigate the impact of privatization on bank efficiency, we take the 
efficiency scores for each bank observation as the dependent variable in second-stage 
regressions having dummy variables for bank type as explanatory variables.  The 
regression coefficients are shown in Table 4; the omitted ownership category is domestic 
de novo private banks. All of the regressions include dummy variables to account for 
country and year fixed effects, although the coefficients of these variables are not 
reported. Because bank privatizations in these six countries usually involve selling a 
state-owned bank to a strategic foreign owner, we include a dummy variable to test for 
the incremental impact of strategic foreign ownership. 11  The dependent variables for the 
four regressions in Table 4 are cost and profit efficiency, an alternative measure of profit 
                                                 
11 In 74% of all privatized-bank observations, a strategic foreign owner is present.  If the observations for 
the Czech voucher-privatized banks are excluded, this percentage is even higher.  
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efficiency, i.e., commission income efficiency, and a performance measure, i.e., ROA, 
for comparison.   
Taking ROA first, ownership type explains very little of the overall variation in 
this financial performance measure.12  Foreign greenfield banks (C1) and privatized 
banks (C4) have significantly higher ROAs than domestic private banks, by 2% and 1.6% 
on average respectively, but the presence of a strategic foreign owner (S) has no 
additional impact on ROA. In the final two rows of Table 4, we include the p-values for 
tests of differences between privatized banks (C4) and state-owned banks (C3) and 
between privatized banks having a strategic foreign owner (C4 + S) and state-owned 
banks. In both cases, privatized banks have significantly higher ROAs than their state-
owned counterparts. This analysis confirms our earlier means tests indicating that 
privatized banks have higher earnings than state-owned banks in these transition 
countries. 
Turning to the efficiency regressions, we find that these regressions explain a 
substantial percentage of the variation in efficiency.13   Foreign greenfield banks are 
significantly more cost and profit efficient and state-owned banks are significantly less 
cost and profit efficient than domestic private banks.  Although privatized banks are 
significantly less profit efficient than domestic private banks, the presence of a foreign 
owner improves the profit efficiency of a bank significantly. No significant differences 
are found between privatized banks and domestic private banks regarding cost efficiency. 
Other comparisons relevant to the impact of privatization are shown by the hypothesis 
                                                 
12 Much of the explained variation is due to country and year fixed effects that are not reported in the table.  
Regressions using other performance measures, which we do not report, exhibit even weaker explanatory 
power. 
13 The coefficient of variation for ROA is 2.9 while it is 0.5 or less for the three efficiency measures. 
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tests in the final two rows of the table.  Specifically, all privatized banks and privatized 
banks having a strategic foreign owner are significantly more cost efficient than state-
owned banks.  When all privatized banks are considered, no significant difference in 
profit efficiency relative to state-owned banks is found.  However, the presence of a 
strategic foreign owner yields significantly higher profit efficiency. Hence, attracting a 
strategic foreign owner in the privatization process improves both profit and cost 
efficiency.  
The regression using an efficiency measure based on commission income 
confirms our earlier means tests.  Foreign greenfield banks are significantly less efficient 
than domestic private banks in fee-for-service activities even though the literature 
suggests that these banks were involved in targeting this profitable business in the 
transition economies. Moreover, all privatized banks are significantly more efficient at 
attracting fee-for-service business than are state-owned banks, although the coefficient 
measuring the incremental impact of a strategic foreign owner is not significant. Taken 
together, our results suggest that domestic private banks, either de novo or privatized, 
have a local comparative advantage in generating fee-for-service income and that banks 
focus more on, and become more efficient at, this activity after privatization. 
In summary, the ownership regressions indicate that, compared with other bank 
types, foreign greenfield banks are the most efficient, except in generating fee-for-service 
business, and that state-owned banks are the least efficient.  In addition, we find evidence 
that having a strategic foreign owner matters to bank efficiency after privatization.  To 
investigate directly the impact of privatization, we divide the state-owned category into 
two groups: banks that are always state-owned in our sample (C30) and observations 
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representing the state-owned pre-privatization histories of banks that are privatized within 
the sample period (C31). In addition, we divide the privatized category into three groups: 
banks that are always privatized in our sample excluding voucher privatized banks (C40), 
denoted early-privatized banks, observations representing the post-privatization 
experiences of banks that are privatized during the sample time period (C41), denoted 
later-privatized banks, and observations representing the voucher experiences of the three 
Czech banks (C42), denoted voucher-privatized banks.14  
The impact of privatization on cost and profit efficiency is shown in the 
regressions in Table 5; country and year dummies are included but their coefficients are 
not reported. The coefficients for foreign greenfield banks change very little in magnitude 
from Table 4; they remain positive and highly significant as expected.  State-owned 
banks that were not privatized during the sample period (C30) remain significantly less 
efficient than domestic private banks by both measures.  Although later-privatized banks 
are also less cost efficient than domestic private banks during their state-owned years, the 
statistical significance of this difference is lower than it is for banks that remain state-
owned throughout the sample period. No other coefficients are significant in the cost 
efficiency regression; in particular, having a strategic foreign owner does not lead to an 
increase in cost efficiency for privatized banks.   
The p-values for additional hypothesis tests provide some evidence that the timing 
of privatization matters to cost efficiency. First, early-privatized banks (C40) are 
significantly more cost efficient than banks that remain state-owned throughout the 
sample (C30).  Second, early-privatized banks (C40) are significantly more cost efficient 
                                                 
14 In our sample, we have four observations that pertain to years in which the Czech banks were privatized 
to strategic foreign investors. These observations are included in C41 not C42 so that C42 contains only the 
voucher experiences of these three banks.  
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relative to the pre-privatization histories of banks that are privatized in the sample (C31).  
In addition, a comparison of later-privatized banks (C41) with their state-owned pre-
histories (C31) does not yield significant improvements in cost efficiency even when the 
incremental effect of a strategic owner is added (C41 + S).  Finally, early-privatized 
banks (C40) are significantly more cost efficient than later-privatized banks (C41), 
indicating that the timing of privatization is important. Our results suggest that achieving 
the full impact of privatization on cost efficiency may take some time.15   
These timing results are confirmed in the profit regression; in addition, the 
importance of the method of privatization is shown. First, voucher privatization does not 
compare with private ownership; voucher-privatized banks are significantly less profit 
efficient than domestic private banks.  Second, voucher privatization does not lead to any 
improvement in profit efficiency; the comparison of voucher-privatized banks (C42) with 
the state-owned pre-privatization histories of privatized banks (C31) indicates no 
significant difference. Third, the comparison of voucher-privatized banks with early-
privatized banks (C40) indicates that voucher-privatized banks are significantly less 
profit efficient than their counterparts that are privatized by other methods.  Finally, later-
privatized banks that attract a strategic foreign owner (C41 + S) are significantly more 
profit-efficient than voucher-privatized banks. Hence, we find no evidence of any 
significant improvement in efficiency attributable to voucher privatization.16  
Finally, the positive impact on profit efficiency of having a strategic foreign 
owner, which we find in the ownership regression, is confirmed in the privatization 
                                                 
15 We tested for selection effects in the privatization process between banks that remain state-owned 
throughout the sample (C30) and the pre-privatization histories of later-privatized banks (C31).  No 
significant differences between these coefficients are found in either the cost or the profit regression. 
16 Similar comparisons of voucher-privatized banks with other bank types yield no significant differences in 
the cost efficiency regression. 
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regression.  The coefficient measuring the incremental effect of a strategic foreign owner 
is positive and significant at the 5% level in the profit regression. Moreover, the 
importance of attracting a strategic foreign owner is evident from the comparison 
between post-privatization experiences and pre-privatization histories.  Comparing all 
later-privatized banks (C41) to their pre-privatization histories (C31) yields no significant 
difference in profit efficiency.  However, when the incremental effect of a strategic 
foreign owner is included (C41 + S), the difference is significant at about the 6% level. 
Hence, we find evidence that attracting a strategic foreign owner in the privatization 
process increases a bank’s profit efficiency.  
In conclusion, the differences in the hypothesis tests using cost and profit 
efficiency measures suggest that, although banks sold to foreign owners are not more 
cost-efficient immediately after privatization, they do manage revenues more efficiently.  
The means test in Table 3 and the ownership regression in Table 4 indicate that banks 
pursue more fee-for-service business and do so more successfully after privatization.  
Taken together, these results suggest that privatized banks with strategic foreign owners 
redirect their attention to this profitable business. However, generating commission 
income requires an upgrading of both technology and human capital, which may have 
adverse effects on the cost side of the ledger for privatized banks and explain the 
insignificant findings for cost efficiency.  Moreover, the robust result that early-
privatized banks are more efficient than later-privatized banks suggests that more time 
may be needed to achieve the full benefits of bank privatization in transition countries. 
Finally, our findings indicate that voucher privatization does not lead to any increase in 
bank efficiency while attracting a strategic foreign investor results in higher profit 
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efficiency.  Hence, we conclude that both the method and the timing of privatization 
matter to bank efficiency.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Our empirical analysis confirms the propositions in the literature that government 
ownership of banks is inefficient and that the entry of foreign banks, which are the most 
efficient of all bank types, improves the performance of banking sectors in transition 
countries. The strategy of privatizing large state-owned banks by selling them to strategic 
foreign investors after recapitalization and cleaning the balance sheets, espoused by the 
policy literature for small, open transition countries, is supported by our empirical 
findings. In terms of equity and earnings, privatized banks resemble foreign greenfield 
banks although they have higher loan loss provisions and more liquid portfolios.  In 
contrast to the conjecture in the literature that foreign banks engage in cream skimming, 
we find that domestic banks, both privatized and de novo, are more successful in pursuing 
fee-for-service business than are foreign banks. Although privatized banks retain their 
inherited ability to collect primary deposits, they make fewer loans relative to assets than 
do foreign banks and focus more on commission income after privatization. 
Disappointingly, we find no evidence that these newly privatized banks are contributing 
to improving the effectiveness of financial intermediation in their respective countries. 
Our empirical evidence indicates that the timing of privatization affects bank 
efficiency. Early-privatized banks are more efficient than later-privatized banks. In 
addition, compared to their pre-privatization histories, later-privatized banks are not more 
efficient. Although this might indicate that the better banks were privatized first, we find 
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no statistically significance evidence that the state-owned banks remaining to be 
privatized are less efficient than were the privatized banks when they were state owned. 
Because we find no evidence of a selection effect, we attribute the above efficiency 
differences to a lag in achieving the full benefits of privatization. We do find that banks 
having a strategic foreign owner are more profit, but not cost, efficient after privatization.  
Taking into account the change in business strategy of focusing more on commission 
income after privatization, we infer that privatized banks incur increased cost to upgrade 
their technology and human capital to compete successfully for this profitable fee-for-
service business but that this investment affects adversely current cost efficiency.   
The method of privatization also matters. We find no evidence of any 
improvements from voucher privatization; for example, early-privatized banks are 
significantly more profit efficient than voucher-privatized banks during a comparable 
time period. We find evidence to support the prescribed policy of attracting a strategic 
foreign owner in the privatization process. Later-privatized banks are not more efficient 
until the impact of a strategic foreign owner is considered. In addition, banks having a 
strategic foreign owner are more profit efficient after privatization but such comparisons 
for all later-privatized banks do not yield this result.  Finally, as a cautionary note for 
further research, our empirical results indicate that financial performance measures are 
not sufficient to detect the impact of bank privatization in transition countries.  
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Table 1  
 
Distribution of Observations across Bank Types 
 
 
 Foreign 
Greenfield 
(1) 
Domestic  
De novo  
(2) 
State  
Owned 
(3) 
Privatized 
 
(4) 
TOTAL Strategic 
Owner 
Bulgaria 15 
(22.1) 
0 
(0) 
37 
(54.4) 
16 
(23.5) 
68 
(15%) 
19% 
Czech 
Rep 
22 
(33.8) 
9 
(13.8) 
6 
(9.2) 
28 
(43.1) 
65 
(14.4%) 
18% 
Croatia 22 
(28.2) 
38 
(48.7) 
11 
(14.1) 
7 
(9.0) 
78 
(17.3%) 
14% 
Hungary 28 
(33.3) 
4 
(4.8) 
13 
(15.5) 
39 
(46.4) 
84 
(18.6%) 
33% 
Poland 8 
(7.0) 
16 
(13.9) 
46 
(40.0) 
45 
(39.1) 
115 
(25.5%) 
31% 
Romania 15 
(36.6) 
8 
(19.5) 
12 
(29.3) 
6 
(14.6) 
41 
(9.1%) 
7% 
TOTAL 
 
110 
24.4% 
75 
16.6% 
125 
27.7% 
141 
31.3% 
451 
100.0% 
23% 
 
Notes 
 
(i) Entries are numbers of bank observations.  
(ii) The percentage distribution by bank type within each country is in 
parentheses.  
(iii) The column labeled TOTAL shows the number of observations in each 
country and the percentage distribution. 
(iv) The row labeled TOTAL shows the number of observations by bank type and 
the percentage distribution.  
(v) For strategic owner, the number shown is the percentage of all bank 
observations in the row. 
 
 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Number 47 55 55 54 59 59 59 54 9 
Number 
Privatized 
and %  
6 
13% 
9 
16% 
11 
20% 
16 
30% 
19 
32% 
24 
41% 
27 
46% 
25 
46% 
4 
44% 
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Table 2 
 
Bank Performance and Characteristics by Bank Type 
 
Banks Privatized in 
Sample* 
 Foreign 
Greenfield 
Domestic  
De Novo 
State  
Owned 
Privatized TOTAL 
Pre Post 
Return on 
Assets 
0.0224 0.0051 0.0042 0.0176 0.0133 0.0047 0.0158 
Commission 
income ratio 
0.014 0.0164 0.0130 0.0186 0.0155 0.0145 0.0204 
Net interest 
margin ratio 
0.0417 0.0375 0.0424 0.0439 0.0422 0.0388 0.0449 
Cost ratio 0.1005 0.1434 0.1862 0.1302 0.1402 0.1631 0.1331 
Non interest 
expenditure 
ratio 
0.0446 0.0713 0.0754 0.0649 0.0652 0.0619 0.0686 
Loan ratio 0.4801 0.3945 0.3734 0.3797 0.4038 0.3745 0.3526 
Deposit ratio 0.7542 0.7583 0.7850 0.7769 0.7690 0.7738 0.7754 
Liquid asset 
ratio 
0.4378 0.4340 0.4932 0.4924 0.4707 0.4924 0.5185 
Equity ratio 0.1171 0.1009 0.0729 0.1122 0.1041 0.0855 0.1187 
Loan loss 
provision 
ratio 
0.0083 0.0171 0.0177 0.0133 0.0142 0.0135 0.0103 
Assets (000$)  
Not adjusted 
813,024 1,606,922 3,036,874 4,742,269 2,798,652 2,501,847 4,073,382 
 
Notes 
 
(i) The total sample size is 451, although not all data are available for every 
variable.  
(ii) All variables, except return on assets and assets, are ratios to total assets. 
(iii) Each entry, except assets, is adjusted to remove the fixed country and year 
effects.  
  
* These columns include observations for banks that were privatized in our sample only; 
there are 78 pre-privatization histories and 83 post-privatization bank experiences. 
However, observations for the second privatizations of the Czech voucher privatized 
banks are not included. 
 
 
 29
 
 
Table 3 
 
Significance of Differences in Bank Performance and Characteristics  
 
Privatized banks less:  
State owned Domestic De 
Novo 
Foreign 
Greenfield 
Post less pre-
privatization 
Return on Assets  2.58  2.92 -1.47  2.12 
Commission income 
ratio 
 5.18  1.68  4.29  3.73 
Net interest margin 
ratio 
 0.39  2.95  1.12  1.57 
Cost ratio -3.68 -1.48  4.76 -1.75 
Non interest 
expenditure ratio 
-1.06 -0.86  4.97  0.63 
Loan  ratio  0.38 -0.84 -5.59 -1.05 
Deposit  ratio -0.81  1.41  1.97  0.11 
Liquid asset ratio -0.04  2.76  2.93  1.09 
Equity ratio  5.17  2.14 -0.25  3.37 
Loan loss provision 
ratio 
-0.73 -0.78  2.59 -0.50 
Assets 
(Not adjusted) 
 3.25  7.26  9.81  2.65 
 
 
Notes (in addition to those to Table 2) 
 
(i) The entries are signed t-statistics for the significance of the difference 
specified. 
(ii) Bold entries are significant at approximately the 5% level or better. 
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Table 4 
 
Ownership regressions 
 
  Cost 
efficiency 
Profit 
efficiency 
Commission 
income 
efficiency 
Return on 
assets 
Constant  0.762* 
(.026) 
0.265* 
(0.039) 
0.835* 
(0.024) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
Foreign Greenfield C1 0.070* 
(0.019) 
0.170* 
(0.029) 
-0.051* 
(0.018) 
0.020* 
(0.006) 
State owned  C3 -0.061* 
(0.020) 
-0.153* 
(0.029) 
-0.038# 
(0.018) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
Privatized  C4 -0.006 
(0.022) 
-0.172* 
(0.032) 
0.038 
(0.020) 
0.016* 
(0.007) 
Strategic owner S 0.016 
(0.021) 
0.123* 
(0.032) 
-0.035 
(0.020) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
 Adjusted R2  .709 .441 .712 .075 
HYPOTHESIS TESTS     
Privatized vs. 
State owned 
H0: 
C4 = C3 
.0081 .5691 .0001 .0135 
Privatized with 
strategic owner vs. 
state owned 
H0: 
C4+S =C3 
.0024 .0002 .0234 .0086 
 
Notes 
 
(i) The omitted category is domestic private banks.   
(ii) The sample size is 435.   
(iii) All regressions include fixed effects for years and countries, although these 
coefficients are not reported.   
(iv) Standard errors are in parentheses.  
(v) For regression coefficients, the symbol * indicates significance at the 1% level 
and the symbol # indicates significance at the 5% level. 
(vi) For hypothesis tests, entries are the significance levels for χ2 tests for rejection 
of the null hypotheses indicated. 
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Table 5 
 
Privatization Regressions 
 
  Cost efficiency 
 
Profit efficiency 
Constant  0.762* 
(0.027) 
0.292* 
(0.041) 
Foreign Greenfield C1 0.067* 
(0.019) 
0.163* 
(0.029) 
Always state owned C30 -0.076* 
(0.024) 
-0.139* 
(0.035) 
State owned prior to 
privatization in sample 
C31 -0.049# 
(0.021) 
-0.160* 
(0.032) 
Always privatized C40 0.048 
(0.030) 
-0.034 
(0.045) 
Privatized in sample C41 -0.022 
(0.024) 
-0.178* 
(0.036) 
Voucher privatization C42 -0.013 
(0.036) 
-0.244* 
(0.053) 
Strategic owner S 0.004 
(0.023) 
0.085# 
(0.034) 
 Adjusted R2  .713 .461 
HYPOTHESIS TESTS   
Privatized early or late  H0:  C40 = C41 .0036 .0001 
Strategic owner matters H0:  S = 0 .8786 .0141 
Voucher differs H0:  C40 = C42 .1649 .0012 
 H0:  C31 = C42 .3105 .1156 
 H0:  C41 = C42 .8095 .2497 
 H0:  C41+S = C42 .8753 .0063 
 H0:  C40+S = C42 .1110 .0000 
Privatization matters H0:  C30 = C40 .0001 .0256 
 H0:  C31 = C41 .2753 .6246 
 H0:  C30 = C40+S .0000 .0000 
 H0:  C31 = C41+S .1974 .0623 
 H0:  C40 = C31 .0016 .0060 
 
 
Notes: See the notes to Table 4. 
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 Appendix A 
 
Ownership and Market Share of Large Banks in Six Transition Economies 
 
 
 Asset 
Share 
Ownership Strategic  
owner 
    
Bulgaria  (2000)   
Bulbank   25.4 Privatized 10/ 00 10/00 
United Bulgarian Bank (UBB) 12.4 Privatized 5/97 7/00 
Derzhavna Spestovna Kassa 
(DSK) 
12.1 Privatized  5/03 
Biochim Bank 5.3 Privatized 10/02 
Bulgarian Post Bank 5.2 Privatized 11/98 
SG Express Bank 4.5 Privatized 11/99 
BNP-Dresdnerbank 3.5 Foreign Greenfield  
Hebrosbank  3.4 Privatized 3/00 
First Investment Bank 3.3 Foreign Greenfield  
ING –Sofia 2.7 Foreign Greenfield  
Total 77.8   
    
Croatia (2000)   
Zagrebacka Banka 28.9 Domestic Private 
Shares sold 12/99 
3/02 
Privredna Banka Zagreb 18.3 Domestic private; Nationalized 
1996; Privatized 12/99 
12/99 
Splitska Banka 7.1 Domestic private; Nationalized 
1996; Privatized 5/00 
5/00 
Rijecka Banka 7.0 Domestic private; Nationalized 
1996; Privatized 4/00 
4/00 
Raiffeisen Bank  4.5 Foreign Greenfield  
Hypo-Alde-Adria-Bank 3.4 Foreign Greenfield  
Dubrovacka Banka    2.9 State owned, acquired by 
Dalmatinska 2/02 
 
Erste&Steiermaerkische Bank 2.7 Foreign Greenfield  
Varazdinska Banka  2.6 Domestic private; Acquired by 
Zagrabacka Banka 6/00 
 
Dalmatinska Banka  2.3 Domestic private 10/00 
Total 79.7   
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Czech Republic  (June 
2001) 
  
Ceskoslovenska Obchodni 
Banka (CSOB) 
21.4 Privatized 6/99 
Merged with IPB 6/00 
6/99 
Investicni a Postovni Banka 
(IPB) 
(part of 
CSOB) 
Voucher privatization 12/92 3/98 
Komercni Banka 18.4 Voucher privatization 12/92 6/01 
Ceska Sporitelna (CS) 15.7 Voucher privatization 12/92 2/00 
Konsolidacni banka * 
(Not a commercial bank)  
9.0 State owned bank for bad debts 
during bank restructuring. 
 
GE Capital (Agrobanka) 2.9 Private domestic; Nationalized 
1996; Privatized 1998 
1998 
Commerzbank*    2.7 Foreign Greenfield  
Bank Austria / Credit Anstalt 
(BACA)  
2.6 Foreign Greenfield  
Citibank  2.6 Foreign Greenfield  
HypoVeriensbank 2.3 Foreign Greenfield  
Deutsche Bank*  2.1 Foreign Greenfield  
Zivnostenska Bank  2.0 Domestic private 2/03 
ABN AMRO*  2.0 Foreign Greenfield  
Total (with Konsolidacni bank  
excluded from banking sector) 
80.0   
    
Hungary (1999)   
National Savings and 
Commercial Bank (OTP) 
25.1 Privatized 7/95  
Hungarian Foreign Trade 
Bank (MKB)  
9.6 Privatized 7/94 1996 
Central-European 
International Bank (CIB) 
8.0 Private domestic  1998 
Kereskedelmi es Hitelbank 
(K&H) 
7.7 Privatized 7/97 
Merged with ABN Amro 7/01 
7/01  
ABN Amro / Magyar Hitel 
Bank    
5.8 Privatized 12/96 
Merged with K&H 7/01 
12/96 
Postabank   4.7 Private domestic; Nationalized 
1998 
 
Budapest Bank (BB) 4.1 Privatized 12/95 12/95 
Bank Austria – Creditanstalt 
Hungary 
4.1 Foreign Greenfield  
Raiffeisen Bank 3.7 Foreign Greenfield  
General Banking Trust 3.5 Privatized 1990 1996 
Total 76.3   
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Poland (1999)   
Powszechny Kasa 
Oszczednosci-Bank 
Panstwowy (PKO BP) 
17.6 State owned  
Bank Polska Kasa Opieki S.A. 
Group (PeKaO  SA)  
17.5 Privatized 6/98 6/99 
Bank Przemyslowo-
Handlowy+Powszechny Bank 
Kredytowy (BPH+PBK) 
9.5 BPH privatized 1/95 
PBK privatized 10/97 
Merger 12/01 
BPH 
11/99 
PBK 
10/97 
Bank Handlowy+Citibank 8.0 Privatized 6/97  
Merged with Citibank 2/00 
2/00 
 
Bank Inicjatyw 
Gospdarczch+Bank Gdanski 
(BIG + BG) 
6.3 BIG Domestic private 
BG privatized 12/95 
Merger 9/98 
1/01 
 
Bank Slaski+ING-Barings 
(ING) 
5.5 Privatised 9/93 
Merged with ING 4/01 
7/96 
Wielkopolski Bank 
Kredytowy+ Bank Zachodni 
(WBK + BZ) 
5.4 WBK privatized 3/93 
BZ privatized 1999 
Merger 12/00 
WBK 
4/97 
BZ 1999 
Bank Gospordarki 
Zywnosciowej (BGZ) 
5.1 State owned  
Kredyt Bank  4.3 Private domestic 1999 
Bank Rozwoju Eksportu 
(BRE) 
4.2 Privatized 6/92 10/00 
Total 83.4   
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Romania (March 
2002) 
  
Banca Comercială Română 
(BCR)  
31.2 State owned  
Banca Română pentru 
Dezvoltare – Société  
Générale 
15.7 Privatized 3/99 3/99 
Casa de Economii şi 
Consemnaţiuni 
8.6 State owned  
ABN Amro Bank 5.5 Foreign Greenfield  
ING Bank Bucharest Branch * 5.1 Foreign Greenfield  
Banc Post 4.1 Privatized 4/99  
Raiffeisen –Banca Agricolă 3.5 Privatized 7/01 7/01 
Banca Comercială „Ion 
Ţiriac” 
3.1 Private domestic  
Citibank   3.1 Foreign Greenfield  
ALPHA Bank 2.7 Foreign Greenfield  
Total 82.6   
 
 
Notes 
 
(i) The symbol * indicates that the bank is not included in sample. For these 
foreign greeenfield banks, no data are reported in BankScope because the 
bank’s balance sheet is consolidated with its parent.  Konsolidacni Banka is 
excluded because it is not a commercial bank. 
  
(ii) The PeKaO Group in Poland includes three of the original nine commercial 
banks hived off from the portfolio of the Central Bank.  These are Pomorski 
Bank Kredytowy (PBKS) in Szczecin, Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy (BDK) 
in Lublin, and Powszechny Bank Gospardarczy (PBG) in Lodz.   
 
(iii) Although not effectuated in 1999, the mergers of some Polish banks, i.e., 
BPH+PBK, Bank Handlowy+Citibank, Bank Slaski+ING, and WBK+BZ, are 
considered to be merged in the table so that we add the assets of the partners 
in 1999 to obtain the newly merged entity’s market share. 
 
 
Sources:  Annual reports of the National Bank of Croatia, the National Bank of Bulgaria, 
the National Bank of Hungary and the National Bank of Romania as well as annual 
reports of individual banks.  In addition, data are also taken from Ceska Bankovni 
Asociace (Czech Republic) and Hungarian Banking Association, 2000.  Data for Poland 
are taken from Najlepsze Banki, 2000 and Gazeta Bankowa, June 10, 2000, p.31.   
 
 
 36
Appendix B 
 
Summary of Stochastic Frontier Estimates 
 
 
 Cost 
efficiency  
Profit 
efficiency  
Commission 
income 
efficiency  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Log Likelihood -129.3 -531.1 -271.2 
σ u   /  σ v   2.93 4.59 1.73 
σ 0.689 1.576 0.708 
λ .90 .95 .75 
Mean efficiency  0.786 0.445 0.758 
Standard deviation  0.219 0.237 0.207 
 
 
Notes  
 
(i) See the text for an explanation of the frontier specification. 
(ii) Frontiers were estimated with the 431 bank observations that contain all the 
data needed for the estimation. Missing information reduced our sample size 
by only 20 observations from the sample used in the means tests. 
(iii) σ u and σ v  are the standard deviations of the composite of the inefficiency and 
random components of the disturbance, respectively.   
(iv) σ is the standard deviation of the overall disturbance, i.e., (u+v) for the cost 
function and (u-v) for the profit function.   
(v) λ =σu2/ σ2 is the proportion of the variance in the overall disturbance that is 
due to inefficiency. 
 
